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1 Introduction and motivation
Hammond’s [6] characterization of the leximin ordering is based on anonymity,
the strong Pareto axiom, and a principle now called Hammond Equity. It has
been recently proven that Hammond Equity is equivalent to a liberal non-
interference property called Harm Principle in the presence of anonymity and
strong Pareto optimality (cf., Mariotti and Veneziani [11]). This seems fairly
surprising since the Harm Principle does not embody any egalitarian consid-
eration while Hammond Equity is a strongly egalitarian property. Extensions
of the analysis to the case of the leximax criterion and also to the case of
infinitely-lived societies appear in Lombardi and Veneziani [8,9]. In particu-
lar, preference continuities permit to characterize infinite extensions of the
leximin criterion both on the basis of Hammond Equity (cf., Asheim and Tun-
godden [3], Bossert et al. [4]) and of adapted versions of the Harm Principle.
Nevertheless, [9] shows that in the evaluation of infinite streams by orderings,
anonymity, the strong Pareto axiom, and preference continuity properties are
incompatible with full non-interference. Restricting ourselves to a finite econ-
omy, Mariotti and Veneziani [10] prove that a fully liberal non-interference
view of the society leads to dictatorship if weak Pareto optimality is imposed.
We intend to explore the consequences of adding standard continuity proper-
ties to non-interference. Our main interest lies on the case of infinite utility
streams but we also state some paralel implications for the case of finitely-
lived societies. The results above inform us of trivial incompatibilities that
derive from lack of continuity of the leximin/leximax criteria. We investigate
more accurate reasons for the conflict among non-interference, optimality, the
equal treatment of the generations and continuity in the evaluation of infinity
utility streams. Then we elaborate on more general views of non-interference
that scarcely provide some routes of escape to the generalised impossibilities
that arise.
2 Notation and axioms
Let X denote a subset of RN, that represents a domain of utility sequences or
infinite-horizon utility streams. We adopt the usual notation for such utility
streams: x = (x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X. By (y)con we mean the constant sequence
(y, y, ....), and (x1, ..., xk, (y)con) = (x1, ..., xk, y, y, ....) denotes an eventually
constant sequence. We write x > y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x y
if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, .... Also, x > y means x > y and x 6= y.
Denote by 1xH−1 = (x1, ..., xH−1) the H-head of x ∈ X, and denote by
Tx = (xT , xT+1, ....) its T -tail, thus x = 1x = (1xn−1, nx) for each n ∈ N.
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The notation above can be trivially adapted to domains of finite-length utility
sequences. Also, a social welfare relation (SWR) is a binary relation < on
X = Rn with n ∈ N ∪ {+∞}. Its asymmetric part is denoted by , and
its symmetric part is denoted by ∼. If < is an ordering (i.e., complete and
transitive) then we call it a social welfare ordering or SWO. We are concerned
with two sets of axioms of different nature on SWRs. We proceed to state and
discuss them.
Firstly we introduce some equity axioms of two different classes for a reflexive
binary relation < on X = [0, 1]N, with asymmetric part . They can be easily
regarded as axioms on [0, 1]n with n ∈ N too as is dutifully clarified along the
exposition.
Anonymity is the usual “equal treatment of all generations” postulate à-la-
Sidgwik and Diamond.
Axiom AN (Anonymity). Any finite permutation of a utility stream produces
a utility stream with the same social utility
We now recall a consequentialist equity axiom that implements preference for
egalitarian allocations of utilities among generations in various senses. Axiom
HE below states that in case of a conflict between two generations, every other
generation being as well off, the stream where the least favoured generation is
better off must be weakly preferred.
Axiom HE (Hammond Equity). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk
for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then y < x.
In a different vein, Mariotti and Veneziani [10,11] introduce non-interference
conditions in the context of a finite society. Under additional requirements
they are intimately related to HE (cf., Mariotti and Veneziani [11, p. 127]).
Their infinite counterparts are deeply analyzed in Lombardi and Veneziani
[8,9]. We proceed to recall these versions for infinite streams:
Axiom HP (Harm Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are eventually coincident
and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ such that: for some i ∈ N, j 6= i
implies x′j = xj and y
′
j = yj. If x
′
i < xi and y
′






In case that only x′ < y′ is ensured in the definition above, we speak of Weak
Harm Principle. Both versions of the principle coincide for weakly dominant
SWOs on X = [0, 1]N .
Axiom IBP (Individual Benefit Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are eventually
coincident and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ such that: for some i ∈ N,
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j 6= i implies x′j = xj and y′j = yj. If x′i > xi and y′i > yi then x′i > y′i implies
x′  y′.
In case that only x′ < y′ is ensured in the definition above, we speak of
Weak Individual Benefit Principle. Both versions of the principle coincide for
weakly dominant SWOs on X = [0, 1]N . The respective versions for finite-
length streams are the same except in that the restriction of the thesis to
eventually coincident vectors does not apply.
We intend to account for some kind of efficiency too. Various axioms capture
the general principle that with respect to a given infinite utility stream, ade-
quate changes must improve the social welfare if every generation is at least as
well off after the change. The Weak Dominance axiom captures the following
spirit: Improving the welfare of exactly one generation suffices to improve the
social welfare. In turn, the Weak Pareto axiom requests that all generations
increase their utility for the social welfare to improve. The Strong Pareto ax-
iom imposes that if at least one generation increases its utility then the social
welfare must improve thus Strong Pareto and Weak Dominance coincide over
sets of finite-length vectors. Formally:
Axiom WD (Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X and there is j ∈ N such that
xj > yj, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then x  y.
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x y, then x  y.
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then x  y.
Another relaxed form of Strong Pareto that is unrelated to either WP or WD
is the uncontroversial Monotonicity.
Axiom M (Monotonicity). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then x < y.
Finally, we list some semicontinuity properties. Below we discuss how they
adapt to the case X = Rn, n ∈ N. For a reflexive binary relation < on
X = RN, the following definitions apply:
Axiom RUSC (Restricted upper semicontinuity with respect to the sup topol-
ogy). For each x ∈ X eventually constant, {y ∈ X : y < x} is closed with
respect to the sup topology.
Axiom RLSC (Restricted lower semicontinuity with respect to the sup topol-
ogy). For each x ∈ X eventually constant, {y ∈ X : x < y} is closed with
respect to the sup topology.
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In general, the sup topology is finer than the product topology but when
X = Rn with n ∈ N, both topologies coincide with the Euclidean topology.
Also in this context, RUSC/RLSC are the ordinary USC/LSC.
We say that P , an asymmetric binary relation, verifies Restricted A-Upper
(resp., A-Lower) semicontinuity or RAUSC (resp., RALSC), when for each
x ∈ X eventually constant, {y ∈ X : xPy} (resp., {y ∈ X : yPx}) is open
with respect to the sup topology. In case that < is an ordering, < is RUSC
(resp., RLSC) if and only if  is RAUSC (resp., RALSC).
3 Impossibility results for semicontinuous relations
In this Section we first produce various impossibility results for social welfare
relations with non-interference properties on X = [0, 1]n , a setting where SP
and WD are the same property. Afterwards we show that they naturally trans-
late into results on X = [0, 1]N . A cardinal variant of the analysis completes
this Section.
3.1 The case of a finite society
In this context it is known that AN, SP, and IBP (resp., either HE or HP)
characterize the extensions of the leximax (resp., leximin): cf., Mariotti and
Veneziani [10, Proposition 2, 3]. Let us recall the definitions of these orderings.
For any x ∈ Rn, let x̄ denote the permutation of x whose components x̄1, .., x̄n
are ranked in ascending order. The leximin ordering <LM is defined by: x LM
y if and only if either x̄1 > ȳ1 or there exists l > 1 such that x̄1 = ȳ1, ... ,
x̄l−1 = ȳl−1, x̄l > ȳl. The leximax ordering <LX is defined by: x LX y if and
only if either x̄n > ȳn or there exists l < n such that x̄n = ȳn, ... , x̄l+1 = ȳl+1,
x̄l > ȳl.
It is now trivial that AN, SP, HP, and IBP are incompatible properties for
a SWO on X = [0, 1]n when n > 1. This impossibility is avoided if AN is
dropped and SP is relaxed to M plus WP (as any dictatorship by a genera-
tion proves). Relaxing SP to WP produces incompatibility too: Mariotti and
Veneziani [10, Theorem 1] prove that WP, HP and IBP together entail dicta-
torship by a generation, which violates AN. As has been said, dropping either
HP or IBP produces compatibility.
Since the extensions of the leximax (resp., leximin) do not verify lower (resp.,
upper) semicontinuity with respect to the sup topology, trivial impossibility
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consequences follow. 2 In this Subsection we clarify the extent of the conflict
among non-interference arguments, Pareto optimality, and semicontinuity by
proving that (a) AN plays no role in such incompatibilities, and (b) if a very
mild reinforcement of M replaces WD then we still obtain conflicting axiomat-
ics.
Regarding our first purpose, the following Propositions 1 and 2 are in order:
Proposition 1 There is no < SWO on X = [0, 1]2 satisfying IBP, WD, and
LSC.
Proof: We prove that the combination of properties in the statement conveys




) for each i = 2, 3, ....
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2
, 1 − 1
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)  (0, 1) for some i0 ∈ {2, 3, ...}. An appeal to IBP yields
(1, 1− 1
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m
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) < (1, 1),
contradicting WD.
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2
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i
)}i converges to (12 , 1) thus LSC
entails (0, 1) < (1
2
, 1), contradicting WD. 
Proposition 2 There is no < SWO on X = [0, 1]2 that verifies HP, WD,
and USC.
Proof: We prove that the combination of properties in the statement conveys




) < (0, 1) for each i = 2, 3, ....
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(0, 1
m
)  ( 1
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)}i converges to (0, 12) thus USC entails
(0, 1
2
) < (0, 1), contradicting WD. 
Regarding objective (b), we preliminarily explore the intimate relationship be-
tween the Harm Principle and Hammond Equity. This reveals another conflict
between HP and RUSC in the presence of AN and a very mild reinforcement
of M, which bears comparison with the conclusion in Proposition 2.
Mariotti and Veneziani [11, p. 127] state that when X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ N, HP
2 Consider the case of the leximax. For each i ∈ N let x(i) = (1 − 1i ,
1
2). With
respect to the sup topology, x(i) converges to x = (1, 12). However (1, 0) 
LX x(i)
and x LX (1, 0).
Now consider the case of the leximin. For each i ∈ N let x(i) = (1i ,
1
2). With respect
to the sup topology, x(i) converges to x = (0, 12). However x
(i) LM (0, 1) and
(0, 1) LM x.
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and HE are equivalent in the presence of AN and WD/SP. Proposition 3 below
shows that relying on M alone permits to deduce the egalitarian HE from HP.
The argument is exported to the case of infinitely-lived sociecties in subsection
3.2 below.
Proposition 3 Let < be a SWO over X = [0, 1]n for some n ∈ {2, 3, ....}. If
< verifies AN, HP and M then < verifies HE.
Proof: Let x,y ∈ X be such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈
{1, 2, ...., n}, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. By contradiction, assume x  y.
Due to AN we can fix j = 1, k = 2 thus 3x = 3y. Consider the vectors
x′ = (x2+y2
2
, 2x) and y
′ = (x2, y2, 3x). They are obtained from x and y by






An appeal to HP and then AN yields x′  y′ ∼ (y2, x2, 3y). But this entails
x′  (y2, x2, 3y) < x′ due to M, a contradiction. 
Proposition 4 below yields the subsequent Corollary 1:
Proposition 4 Let < be a SWR on X = [0, 1]2. Suppose
∃x ∈ X such that x < y = (y1, x2) is false and y1 > x1 > x2 (1)
Then < does not verify HE and RUSC simultaneously. 3
Proof: By contradiction. Define y(n) according to: y
(n)
1 = x1, y
(n)




With respect to the sup topology, y(n) converges to x. For each n > 1
x1−x2 ,
HE entails y(n) < y because y1 > x1 = y
(n)





2 > x2. This means
x < y due to RUSC, contradicting the assumption. 
Corollary 1 There is no < SWO on X = [0, 1]2 that verifies AN, HP, RUSC
and M plus condition (1) above.
Proof: By Proposition 3, < verifies HE. Now Proposition 4 applies. 
Our last result in this regard replicates the incompatibility shown by Corollary
1 in terms of IBP. The reader is invited to mimick its proof in order to give a
direct argument for Corollary 1 that circumvents Propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 There is no < SWO on X = [0, 1]2 that verifies AN, IBP,
RLSC and M plus the following condition (2):
∃x ∈ X such that there are x2 > x1 > y1 for which x  y = (y1, x2) (2)
3 Observe that condition (1) holds under e.g., WD/SP.
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Proof: By contradiction. Define x(n) ∈ X according to: x(n)1 = x1, x
(n)
2 =
x2 − 1n . With respect to the sup topology, x
(n) converges to x. Thus there is
n0 such that x
(n)  y when n > n0, due to RLSC.




,x2) ∼ (x2, x2 −
1
m




because x1 < x2, y1 < x2 − 12m , x2 −
1
2m
< x2 and x
(m) = (x1, x2 − 1m)  y =
(y1, x2). This conclusion contradicts M. 
3.2 The case of an infinitely-lived society
Most of the arguments in the preceding subsection carry forward to the case
of infinite sequences of utilities. In this subsection we discuss the details.
In order to convert Propositions 1 and 2 into statements for infinitely-lived
societies, it suffices to appeal to the following relaxed version of WD:
Axiom RWD (Restricted Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X are eventually
constant, and there is j ∈ N such that xj > yj, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then
x  y.
By adding a (0con) tail to the vectors in use along the proofs of Propositions
1 and 2 one gets:
Proposition 6 There is no < SWO on X = [0, 1]N that verifies IBP (res.,
HP), RWD, and RLSC (resp., RUSC).
The reader can easily mimick the arguments in Propositions 3 and 5 to produce
the following twin statement for infinitely-lived societies: 4
Proposition 7 Let < be a SWO over X = [0, 1]N. If < verifies AN, HP and
either WD or M then < verifies HE.
Proposition 8 There is no anonymous < SWO on X satisfying either of the
following sets of conditions:
(a) HP, RUSC, and either RWD or M plus condition (1′) below:
∃x ∈ X eventually constant such that there are y1 > x1 > x2 for which
x  y = (y1, 2x) (1′), or
4 Proposition 8 is reexplored in Subsection 3.3 below.
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(b) IBP, RLSC, and either RWD or M plus condition (2′) below:
∃x ∈ X eventually constant such that there are x2 > x1 > y1 for which
x  y = (y1, 2x) (2′)
With respect to Proposition 6, Proposition 8 brings to light an incompatibility
under another very mild version of Paretianity –in fact, an extremely weak
strengthening of the unavoidable monotonicity– when AN is imposed.
3.3 Revisiting the analysis under a cardinal perspective
Now we check for possible changes in the analysis above when well-beings are
universally comparable and cardinally measurable. We consider the following
cardinal forms of the non-interference principles whose implications we have
inspected thus far:
Axiom IEHP (Individual Equal Harm Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are
eventually coincident and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ such that: for
some i ∈ N, j 6= i implies x′j = xj and y′j = yj. If x′i = xi − ε and y′i = yi − ε
for some ε > 0 then x′  y′.
This axiom is not a direct descendant of the Harm Principle but it captures a
related idea: If a stream is socially better than another one and the welfare of a
given generation is reduced by the same amount in both distributions then the
relative ranking of the resulting streams is the same as in their pre-reduction
comparison. We believe that this is an appealing invariance behavior. It claims
that an equal deprivation to one generation that does not affect any other
generation should not be a cause for reconsidering the social judgement over
distributions. The “individual” relative rankings that the distributions convey




i– is immaterial and only the fact that the penalisation is
the same matters. A similar defense holds for the other side of the coin:
Axiom IEBP (Individual Equal Benefit Principle). Antecedent as in IEHP,
thesis as follows: If x′i = xi + ε and y
′
i = yi + ε for some ε > 0 then x
′  y′.
The respective versions for finite-length streams are the same except in that
the restriction of the conclusion to eventually coincident vectors does not ap-
ply. We do not explore this context in depth because to the effect of comparing
the ordinal and cardinal positions, we just need to observe that summing up
the components is a WD/SP, AN, IEHP, IEBP, continuous with respect to
the sup topology evaluation.
Let us therefore focus on infinitely-lived societies.
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1) The reader can ellaborate on Proposition 3 in order to check that if a
SWO is AN, IEHP, and either WD or M then it verifies the Weak Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle (WPDT) as defined e.g., in Hara et al. [7, p. 185].
It is remarkable that in the presence of a procedural equity axiom like AN,
cardinal non-interference implies a behavior that embodies a preference for
egalitarian distribution of utilities among generations.
2) A possibility result emerges from Proposition 6 by replacing HP/IBP with
their cardinal variants above. This reduces to check that discounted utilitarian-
ism agrees with both IEHP and IEBP, as well as being SP, RUSC, and RLSC,
and representable. By contrast with the case of general non-interference, util-
itarianism can be reconciled with a cardinal approach to these principles.
3) It is less obvious that the conclusion in Proposition 8 does not vary if
IEHP replaces HP in case (a), and IEBP replaces IBP in case (b). Proposi-
tion 10 below in particular leads to such consequence although in order to
avoid distracting technicalities we state and prove a clear-cut statement and
then comment upon other variations. Irrespective of the exact conclusion this
shows that for infinitely-lived societies, the equal treatment of all generations
is a cause for incompatibilities with cardinal non-interference principles un-
der mild consistency, efficiency and continuity requirements. In order to state
Propositions 9 and 10, the following properties are needed:
Axiom AEHP (Anonymous Equal Harm Principle). Suppose x,y ∈ X are
eventually coincident and x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ such that: for
some i, k ∈ N, j 6= i implies x′j = xj, and j 6= k implies y′j = yj.
If x′i = xi − ε and y′k = yk − ε for some ε > 0 then x′  y′.
Axiom AEBP (Anonymous Equal Benefit Principle). Antecedent as in AEHP,
thesis as follows: If x′i = xi + ε and y
′
k = yk + ε for some ε > 0 then x
′  y′.
Observe that SWOs that satisfy AN and IEHP (resp., IEBP) verify AEHP
(resp., AEBP) too. Therefore AEHP and AEBP capture consequences of the
equal treatment of all generations together with cardinal non-interference un-
der sufficiently consistent evaluations.
Proposition 9 There is no asymmetric SWR on X that verifies AEHP (resp.,
AEBP), RAUSC (resp., RALSC), and RWD.
Proof: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose  is asymmetric and veri-
fies AEBP, RALSC, and RWD. Using RWD we select x = (x1, (x2)con) 
(y1, (x2)con) = y with x2 > x1 > y1.
For each n > 1
x2
, define x(n) ∈ X according to: x(n)1 = x1, x
(n)
k = x2 − 1n for
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such that x(n)  y when n > n0, due to RALSC. We fix m > n0
with the additional property m > 1
2(1−(x1−y1)) . Because 2m− 2m(x1 − y1) > 1
there is T ∈ N ∩ ( 2m(x1 − y1), 2m ) thus 1 > T2m > x1 − y1.






















































RWD yields (y1 +
T
2m
, (x2)con)  (x1, x2− 12m , T..... , x2−
1
2m
, (x2− 1m)con), which
contradicts asymmetry of .
The other instance of the statement is proven by a simple modification of the
argument above. 
With a tedious modification of the previous technique it is direct to prove the
following variation that generalizes Proposition 8:
Proposition 10 There is no SWO on X satisfying either of:
(a) AEHP, RUSC, and either RWD or M plus condition (1′), or
(b) AEBP, RLSC, and either RWD or M plus condition (2′).
Remark 1 The results in this Subsection can be confronted with Asheim and
Tungodden [3, Prop. 4, 5]. They show that a property related to the conjunc-
tion of IEHP and IEBP, namely 2-Generation Unit Comparability or 2UC,
permits to characterize utilitarian overtaking criteria. In particular they prove
the existence of reflexive and transitive relations with SP, AN, 2UC and two
respective forms of preference continuity. It is simple to check that overtak-
ing not only verifies SP, AN, and Weak Preference Continuity (cf., [3, Prop.
5]), but also IEHP and IEBP. This speaks for the strong restrictions that
weak semicontinuity axioms –in the usual sense– impose to anonymous equal
harm/benefit behaviors.
Remark 2 In the context of a finite society, Mariotti and Veneziani [10] state
a property in line with the conjunction of adapted versions of IEHP and IEBP,
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namely, Uniform Additive Non-Interference. They prove that SWOs that verify
SP, AN, and Uniform Additive Non-Interference only deviate from the utili-
tarian ordering in comparisons between indifferent elements for the utilitarian
rule.
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